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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Nicholas James Longee appeals from the judgment of conviction for grand theft 
by possession of stolen property, unlawful possession of a firearm, solicitation of grand 
theft by disposing of stolen property, and being a persistent violator following a jury trial 
at which he represented himself. On appeal, he asserts that the district court committed 
fundamental error in violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment right to 
testify, when it instructed the jury that he was not a witness and that nothing he said 
was evidence. He further asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he 
was a persistent violator because the two prior convictions upon which the State relied 
did not constitute two separate convictions under State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Nicholas Longee was charged by Information with grand theft by possession of 
stolen property, unlawful possession of a firearm, solicitation of grand theft by disposing 
of stolen property, and being a persistent violator. (R., pp.49-52.) Mr. Longee 
proceeded to trial representing himself. (See generally Trial Tr.) At trial, the State 
presented testimony from witnesses to establish that, inter alia, five guns had been 
stolen from the residence of William Tharp during a burglary. 1 (Trial Tr., p.116, L.6 -
p.131, L.23, p.136, L.11 -p.155, L.12.) 
1 The magistrate declined to bind Mr. Longee over on the burglary charge, having found 
the evidence to be insufficient to establish his involvement. (Preliminary Hearing 
Tr., p.76, L.12- p.80, L.6.) 
1 
In order to establish that Mr. Longee was in possession of the guns, which were 
not recovered from Mr. Longee, the State presented three witnesses. (See generally 
Trial Tr.) The first, Kenneth Worth, a twice-convicted burglar then in custody on new 
felony charges, testified that Mr. Longee, a person he knew from the rider program and 
his neighbor in a halfway house,2 had attempted to get him to recover and sell guns that 
had come from "some house out in the country." (Trial Tr., p.186, L.6 - p.190, L.12.) 
Mr. Worth testified that he had no desire to get involved, but did agree to give 
Mr. Longee a ride to the home of Omar Padilla. (Trial Tr., p.190, L.24 - p.192, L.23.) 
Mr. Worth knew Mr. Padilla from having spent one week in the same cell block with him 
in 2010. (Trial Tr., p.193, L.24 - p.194, L.10.) Mr. Worth eventually acknowledged that 
he was told by the prosecutor that he would receive "consideration" for his testimony 
against Mr. Longee. (Trial Tr., p.213, L.16 - p.214, L.1.) 
The State then called Omar Padilla, a convicted felon in custody on a new felony 
charge (Trial Tr., p.245, Ls.2-4), who testified that he originally met Mr. Longee while 
they were in jail together the preceding year, and had received a call from Mr. Longee 
saying that he urgently needed to meet with him. (Trial Tr., p.215, L.19 - p.219, L.9.) 
Mr. Padilla agreed to meet with Mr. Longee at the home of his girlfriend, Ashtyn Jones, 
and after Mr. Longee arrived, he asked Mr. Padilla if he could give him a ride to a 
friend's house "to pick up some thumpers." (Trial Tr., p.220, L.16 - p.221, L.10.) 
Mr. Padilla agreed, believing that "thumpers" was slang for speakers. (Trial Tr., p.221, 
L.11 - p.223, L.4.) Ultimately, with Ms. Jones driving, they ended up stopping on a rural 
2 Upon being allowed to proceed pro se, Mr. Longee withdrew a Motion in Limine filed 
by his attorney which sought to exclude mention of his probation status, the nature of 
his prior felony convictions, and his residing in a halfway house at the time of the 
alleged incident in this case, reasoning that he "had nothing to hide." (Tr., p.17, L.2 -
p.19, L.7.) 
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road, at which point Mr. Padilla and Mr. Longee exited the car. Mr. Longee then went to 
a "little ditch or canal" from which he returned with a pillowcase which he put into the 
trunk, after which they drove back to town. (Trial Tr., p.223, L.4 - p.229, L.12.) 
When they arrived in town, Mr. Padilla and Mr. Longee got out of the car because 
Mr. Longee wanted to show Mr. Padilla the "thumpers." (Trial Tr., p.230, Ls.1-6.) 
Mr. Padilla then discovered that the "thumpers" were actually five handguns, which 
Mr. Longee asked him to sell for him for no less than $80 apiece, with Mr. Padilla's 
payment being that he could keep one of the guns. {Trial Tr., p.230, L.12 - p.232, 
L. 10.) While Mr. Padilla was "scared" because he was a convicted felon and believed 
the guns to be stolen, he "play[ed] along" and agreed to Mr. Longee's proposal. (Trial 
Tr., p.232, L.11 - p.234, L.22.) After driving away, Ms. Jones "was crying," which 
Mr. Padilla believed was because she had overheard his discussion with Mr. Longee 
about the guns. (Trial Tr., p.234, L.25 - p.235, L.7.) At that point, they talked, and 
weighed their options, which included putting the guns back in the ditch or throwing 
them in the garbage or off of a bridge before deciding to consult with an off-duty police 
officer that they knew. (Trial Tr., p.235, Ls.7-25, p.240, L.16 - p.241, L.16.) Before 
talking to the police officer, Mr. Padilla put the guns in the backyard of a house. {Trial 
Tr., p.236, Ls.1-7.) After talking to the police officer, they took two on-duty officers to 
the house where the guns were recovered. (Trial Tr., p.236, L.8 - p.238, L.6.) When 
Mr. Longee later called Mr. Padilla to inquire as to the money for the guns, Mr. Padilla 
told him that he had "turned the guns in," which upset Mr. Longee who then gave 
Mr. Padilla one week to come up with the money for the guns (Trial Tr., p.238, L.7 -
p.239, L.12.) 
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Ms. Jones testified that she gave Mr. Longee a ride to the country where he 
picked up a something that looked like a "bag or a pillow case," which he put in the 
trunk. (Trial Tr., p.273, L.6 - p.281, L.22.) When they got back to town, Mr. Padilla and 
Mr. Longee went to the trunk and were "looking through the stuff, whatever it was" when 
she heard Mr. Longee say "[.]45 and .22," which she believed were references to guns. 
(Trial Tr., p.281, L.20 - p.283, L.11.) After they dropped Mr. Longee off at his home, 
she began "freaking out" before she and Mr. Padilla decided what to do about the 
situation, eventually deciding to turn the guns in to the police. (Trial Tr., p.284, L4 -
p.286, L.2.) 
According to the police, the manner in which the police who recovered the guns 
from Mr. Padilla's possession handled them "eliminated any chances of being able to 
get the fingerprints from those firearms." (Trial Tr., p.317, L.13 - p.318, L.5.) An 
attempt to lift fingerprints from the guns approximately one month after they were seized 
was unsuccessful. (Trial Tr., p.325, L.7 - p.326, L.9.) 
After calling a witness, Samuel Ferrell, who didn't testify to anything of 
significance, Mr. Longee testified on his own behalf concerning the events at issue. 
(Trial Tr., p.362, L.15 - p.379, L.25.) Mr. Longee testified that he had saved up enough 
money to buy his first car, and had enough extra that he could buy a stereo system. He 
asked Mr. Worth whether he knew anyone who could get him "a good deal" on a stereo 
system, and, after making a few phone calls, Mr. Worth told him that Mr. Padilla could 
be of help. Remembering Mr. Padilla from his time in the rider program, Mr. Longee 
agreed to meet with Mr. Padilla, who told him that he would need to pick the speakers 
up but didn't want his girlfriend, Ms. Jones, knowing about it. As such, he told 
Mr. Longee to pretend that the items being picked up were Mr. Longee's. Ms. Jones 
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then agreed to give Mr. Longee a ride to pick up what she thought were his items. (Trial 
Tr., p.379, L.6-p.381, L.18.) 
Mr. Longee testified that he was somewhat familiar with the area where 
Mr. Padilla had told him the speakers were, but that he relied on hand signals from 
Mr. Padilla to know exactly where to tell Ms. Jones to turn and stop. (Trial Tr., p.381, 
L.21 - p.382, L.11.) When they got to the location, Mr. Padilla showed him where a 
pillowcase was in the ditch. (Trial Tr., p.382, Ls.12-17.) The pillowcase contained 
boxes, which he later learned contained guns, but which Mr. Longee believed were 
"some sort of speaker." (Trial Tr., p.382, L.22 - p.383, L.2.) Mr. Longee retrieved the 
pillowcase as instructed, and placed it in the trunk of Ms. Jones' car, at which point they 
headed back to town. (Trial Tr., p.383, Ls.3-6.) Upon arriving back in town, Mr. Padilla 
showed Mr. Longee that the pillowcase contained guns, at which point Mr. Longee said, 
"Oh, crap. That's a .22. That's a .45," causing Mr. Padilla to "shush[]" him while 
pointing to Ms. Jones, who was still in the car. (Trial Tr., p.383, L.17 - p.384, L.8.) 
Mr. Padilla then unsuccessfully sought to have Mr. Longee hold onto the guns for him. 
(Trial Tr., p.384, Ls.9-21.) Mr. Padilla then had Ms. Jones give Mr. Longee a ride home, 
after which he had no further contact with Mr. Padilla. (Trial Tr., p.384, L.22 - p.385, 
L.4.) Mr. Longee did not call the police on Mr. Padilla because he didn't want to 
become a "snitch." (Trial Tr., p.403, L.21 - p.404, L.5.) 
While instructing the jury as to the law it must follow in reaching a verdict, the 
district court orally instructed the jury as follows: 
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including: 
One, arguments and statements by lawyers, or in this case, Mr. Longee. 
The lawyers and Mr. Longee are not witnesses. What they say in their 
opening statements, closing arguments, and at other times is intended to 
help you interpret the evidence but is not evidence. If the facts as you 
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remember them differ from the way the lawyers or Mr. Longee have stated 
them, follow your memory .... 
(Trial Tr., p.469, L.21 - p.470, L.6 (emphases added).) 
At trial on the persistent violator allegation, the State presented no evidence, 
resting on the two judgments of conviction that were introduced at trial on the criminal 
charges. (Trial Tr., p.522, L.14 - p.523, L.6.) Ultimately, relying only on the judgments 
of conviction, the jury found Mr. Longee to be a persistent violator. (Trial Tr., p.529, 
Ls.1-25.) 
Prior to announcing its sentencing decision, the district court explained that "the 
effect of the persistent violator conviction is that this court needs to make a statement to 
both a defendant and as well as the public at large that if you have become convicted of 
being a persistent violator that that has to have some type of consequence, more than 
just a charge on a piece of paper." (Tr., p.87, Ls.10-16.) Ultimately, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of twenty years, with five years fixed, for grand theft by 
possession of stolen property, and concurrent sentences of five years fixed on the 
remaining two charges. (Tr., p.91, Ls.10-18.) 
Mr. Longee filed a timely Notice of Appeal. (R., p.306.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court commit fundamental error, in violation of Mr. Longee's Fifth, 
Sixth, And Fourteenth Amendment right to testify at trial, when it instructed the 
jury that he was not a witness and that nothing he said was evidence? 
2. Must the persistent violator finding be vacated because it was not supported by 
sufficient evidence? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Committed Fundamental Error. In Violation Of Mr. Longee's Fifth. 
Sixth. And Fourteenth Amendment Right To Testify At Trial, When It Instructed The Jury 
That He Was Not A Witness And That Nothing He Said Was Evidence 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Longee asserts that the district court committed fundamental error, in 
violation of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment right to testify, when it instructed 
the jury that he was not a witness and that nothing he said was evidence. Because the 
error was constitutional, plain, and was not harmless, his convictions must be vacated, 
with this matter remanded for a new trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010), the Idaho Supreme Court announced a 
new standard of review to be applied to unobjected to error, which it set forth as follows: 
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it 
shall only be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental 
error doctrine. Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the 
defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the 
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists; and (3) was not harmless. If the 
defendant persuades the appellate court that the complained of error 
satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court shall vacate and 
remand. 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has concluded that unobjected to instructional errors 
are to be analyzed under the three-prong test set forth in Perry. State v. Sutton, 151 
Idaho 161, 165-66 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 
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C. The District Court Committed Fundamental Error, In Violation Of Mr. Longee's 
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment Right To Testify At Trial, When It 
Instructed The Jury That He Was Not A Witness And That Nothing He Said Was 
Evidence 
Following Mr. Longee's testimony and prior to the jury's deliberations, the district 
court orally instructed the jury as follows: 
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including: 
One, arguments and statements by lawyers, or in this case, Mr. Longee. 
The lawyers and Mr. Longee are not witnesses. What they say in their 
opening statements, closing arguments, and at other times is intended to 
help you interpret the evidence but is not evidence. If the facts as you 
remember them differ from the way the lawyers or Mr. Longee have stated 
them, follow your memory .... 
(Trial Tr., p.469, L.21 - p.470, L.6 (emphases added).) This instruction was 
immediately preceded by an instruction in which the district court explained, "You are to 
decide the facts from all the evidence presented in the case. The evidence you are to 
consider consists of: one, sworn testimony of witnesses .... " (Trial Tr., p.469, Ls.13-
16.) The instruction was immediately followed by an instruction on factors to consider in 
deciding whether to believe the testimony of a witness. (Trial Tr., p.470, L.11 - p.471, 
L.5.) 
Prior to the recognition of the constitutional right to testify, criminal defendants 
were almost uniformly deprived of the ability to testify under oath at their own trials on 
the grounds that they were incompetent to do so because they had an interest in the 
proceedings. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 572~86 (1961) (providing 
historical background of the prohibition and steps taken to ameliorate the harsh effects 
of the rule). "Under the common law, the practice did develop of permitting criminal 
defendants to tell their side of the story, but they were limited to making an unsworn 
statement that could not be elicited through direct examination by counsel and was not 
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subject to cross-examination." Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 49 (1987). In Ferguson, 
the Court recognized the limitations of such unsworn statements, explaining that they 
were not evidence and that jurors frequently receive commentary from the courts 
highlighting the fact that such statements are not made under oath, are not subject to 
cross-examination, are not evidence, that making a false statement does not subject the 
defendant to any liability for perjury, and that the jurors may give it whatever value they 
wish. Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 587-89. 
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right, under the Fifth, Sixth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, to testify at trial. Rock, 483 U.S. at 51-53. 
In recognizing this right, the Supreme Court has explained that it is "one of the rights 
that 'are essential to due process of law in a fair adversary process.' The necessary 
ingredients of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of 
liberty without due process of law include a right to be heard and to offer testimony ... 
. " Id. at 51 (citation omitted). Explaining its importance, the Court concluded that "the 
most important witness for the defense in many criminal cases is the defendant 
himself." Id. at 52. A constitutional right can be violated through an erroneous jury 
instruction. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1973) (defective reasonable doubt 
instruction violating Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial); see also Cupp v. Naughten, 
414 U.S. 141, 146 (1973) (holding that, in federal habeas proceedings challenging state 
court conviction, an erroneous instruction can only result in reversal if "it violated some 
right which was guaranteed to the defendant by the Fourteenth Amendment"). 
In Wilson v. Mitchell, 498 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2007), the Sixth Circuit considered 
whether a penalty phase instruction in a prose defendant's capital murder trial violated 
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the defendant's due process right to have the jury consider all mitigating evidence in 
deciding whether to sentence him to death.3 That instruction read as follows: 
In this phase, the Defendant made a statement, but he did not testify 
under oath and was not subject to cross-examination. It is his right under 
Ohio law to make such a statement and this statement of the Defendant, 
although not considered evidence, may be considered by you for whatever 
purpose you would assign. 
Wilson, 498 F.3d at 514 (emphasis in original). In concluding that it did not violate his 
due process rights, the Sixth Circuit noted that, while the trial court had told the jury the 
statement was not evidence, "the court also instructed that the jury may consider it for 
whatever purpose it would assign" meaning that "there is no reasonable likelihood that 
the instructions prevented the jury's consideration of the statement." Additionally, even 
assuming it did, "the jury considered similar mitigating evidence from other witnesses at 
sentencing, so the instructions regarding his statement could not have so infected the 
entire trial as to violate due process." Id. 
Unlike the instruction recognized as appropriate in Wilson, the instruction given in 
Mr. Longee's case prohibited the jury from considering Mr. Longee's testimony for any 
purpose other than "to help interpret the evidence," while also informing the jury that, as 
a matter of law, he was not a witness and that nothing he said was evidence. While the 
right at issue in this case (the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment right to testify) 
differs from the right considered in the Wilson opinion (the Fourteenth Amendment due 
3 The due process right identified by the court derives from the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), in which it held: 
[T]hat the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentence, 
in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, 
as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and 
any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a 
basis for a sentence less than death. 
11 
process right to present all mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of a capital 
case), the logic and analysis are appropriate to apply to Mr. Longee's case. Unlike the 
situation in Wilson, the jury in Mr. Longee's case was not only told that it could not 
consider any of his statements for evidentiary purposes but that it could only use them 
"to help interpret the evidence," the same consideration that was to be given to 
statements made by the prosecutor. Additionally, there were no other witnesses who 
provided the information that Mr. Longee provided through his testimony, which, if 
believed, exculpated him from any liability for the crimes charged. In light of the 
significant differences between the permissible instruction in Wilson and the instruction 
given in Mr. Longee's case, he asserts that his due process rights and his right to testify 
were violated by the instruction. 
In considering the effect of jury instructions, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated, 
"We must presume that the jury followed the jury instructions in arriving at their verdict." 
Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Gas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299, 335 (2010) (citation 
omitted). In light of this presumption and the nature of the evidence presented in the 
State's case, in which the only witnesses that established Mr. Longee's guilt were two 
convicted felons and a girlfriend of one of the felons, the instructional error, through 
which the jury was forbidden to consider Mr. Longee's exculpatory testimony as 
evidence, was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.4 As such, this Court should 
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). 
4 Mr. Longee does not assert, nor does he believe, that the district court intended to 
instruct the jury to disregard his testimony. However, the instruction, as read, had the 
effect of doing so, regardless of the district court's intent (which is irrelevant to the issue 
of whether the instruction violated Mr. Longee's rights). See State v. Parsons, 153 
Idaho 666 (Ct. App. 2012) (the Court of Appeals expressing no doubt that an erroneous 
oral instruction, which effectively directed a verdict on an element, was not intended to 
have such an effect). 
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vacate the judgment of conviction, and remand this matter for a new trial at which 
Mr. Longee's constitutional right to testify will be honored.5 
11. 
The Persistent Violator Finding Must Be Vacated Because It Was Not Supported By 
Sufficient Evidence 
At trial, the only evidence that the State presented to support the persistent 
violator enhancement were certified copies of two convictions for burglary, for which 
sentence was imposed on the same day following guilty pleas that had been entered on 
the same day. While the two judgments of conviction bore different case numbers, 
there is no indication that the burglaries were committed on different dates, involved 
different victims, or were not part of a common scheme or plan. In light of the Idaho 
Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Brandt, 110 Idaho 341 (Ct. App. 1986), the 
evidence presented by the State was insufficient to support the jury's finding of two 
separate felony convictions for purposes of the persistent violator enhancement. As 
such, the persistent violator finding must be vacated, with this matter remanded for 
resentencing without the persistent violator enhancement. 
Idaho's persistent violator statute provides: 
Any person convicted for the third time of the commission of a felony, 
whether the previous convictions were had within the state of Idaho or 
were had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent 
violator of the law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a 
-temt-iA-tl'le--c-ustoefy-of-t-he-s-tate-boafd--0f-c-0rrectioR whictl-term-shall be for ---
not less than five (5) years and said term may extend to life. 
1.C. § 19-2514. 
5 For the reasons set forth in part II, infra, the persistent violator enhancement should 
not be a part of Mr. Longee's new trial, as the State failed to support it with sufficient 
evidence. 
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In considering Idaho's persistent violator statute, the Idaho Court of Appeals has 
noted, "The majority of jurisdictions do not permit multiple convictions entered the same 
day or charged in the same information to be used to establish a defendant's status as 
a habitual offender" based on the logic that "a defendant should be entitled to an 
opportunity to reform himself between convictions or that the persistent violator statute 
seeks to warn first time offenders." Brandt, 110 Idaho at 344 (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). In its first chance to interpret Idaho's persistent violator statute, the 
Court of Appeals adopted this majority rule, explaining, "Generally, we agree with the 
majority that convictions entered the same day or charged in the same information 
should count as a single conviction for purposes of establishing habitual offender 
status." Id. (emphasis added). It did incorporate an exception to the general rule, 
explaining, "[T]he nature of the convictions in any given situation must be examined to 
make certain that the general rule is appropriate." Id. 
Applying both the general rule and the exception to the facts of Brandt's case, 
the court explained that his prior convictions fell under the exception for the following 
reasons: 
The three offenses here were charged in three separate informations and 
each charge represented a separate crime occurring in a separate 
location with a separate victim. One of the crimes took place in February, 
1984, and the other two crimes in January, 1984. The judgments and 
sentences were imposed the same day because of a plea bargain 
agreement that resulted in some charges being dismissed. One of the 
charges dropped happened t{) be a persistent violator charge; Since he 
had negotiated a dismissal of the first persistent violator charge, Brandt 
could hardly argue that he was not aware of the nature of such a charge 
or that he had not been warned of the consequences of repetitive criminal 
conduct. The purpose of our persistent violator statute is to punish repeat 
offenders by making their sentences for successive crimes more harsh. 
Id. at 344 (citation omitted). 
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The general rule set forth in Brandt has since been applied several times by the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. In State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563 (Ct. App. 1999), the 
Court of Appeals upheld the district court's conclusion that two prior felony convictions 
from Arkansas fell within the scope of Brandfs general rule, thus precluding imposition 
of a persistent violator enhancement. The court described the facts underlying those 
prior convictions as follows: 
Harrington was apprehended while attempting to burglarize a local Piggly 
Wiggly. Harrington admitted during his interrogation that he had 
burglarized that very same grocery store ten days prior. The State of 
Arkansas filed separate indictments on the two charges, but they had 
consecutive case numbers. Harrington pied guilty to both charges on 
December 9, 1993, in one proceeding before the same judge. Sentences 
for both convictions were entered on the same day and were identical. 
Harrington, 133 Idaho at 565. In concluding that the district court correctly applied 
Brandfs general rule, the Court of Appeals explained, 
Admittedly, the charges have separate case numbers and separate 
informations, although filed simultaneously, but we cannot allow the state 
of Idaho to circumvent the general rule of Brandt simply because an 
Arkansas prosecutor declined to consolidate these cases. Harrington's 
convictions were basically separate parts of a common scheme or plan 
and obviously could have been charged in one information, thus placing 
him squarely within the general rule articulated in Brandt. 
Id. at 566. 
In two other cases, the facts of which are easily distinguishable from those of 
Mr. Longee's case, the Court of Appeals has found that the exception recognized in 
Brandt applied. In- one, the Court ef Appeals noted that, although the two convictions 
were entered on the same day before the same judge, the "two prior felony convictions 
were unrelated crimes, grand theft and felony DUI, committed on different dates in 
different counties." State v. Mace, 133 Idaho 903, 907 (Ct. App. 2000). Furthermore, 
Mace did not even argue that the general rule in Brandt applied, having 
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"acknowledge[d] that because his prior felonies were unrelated crimes charged in 
separate informations, they do not qualify for treatment as a single conviction under the 
rule enunciated in Brandt." Id. Instead, Mace argued for the exception to Brandfs 
general rule to be overruled, which the Court of Appeals declined to do. Id. In the 
second, the Court of Appeals found that the exception to the general rule applied 
because the "convictions were for separate crimes perpetrated on separate victims. 
They consisted of two burglaries in different counties, and one escape from a jail. 
These convictions were for distinguishable incidents of criminal conduct. Consequently, 
it was permissible to treat them as evidence of multiple prior felonies." State v. Smith, 
116 Idaho 553, 560 (Ct. App. 1989). 
The only similarity between Mr. Longee's prior convictions and those that the 
court used in applying the exception in Brandt is that they were almost certainly charged 
in separate charging instruments, which can be inferred from the fact that two separate 
judgments were prepared, each containing a different case number. (State's Exhibit 
Nos. 41 and 42.) That, however, is where the similarities end. In contrast to the facts 
presented by the State in Brandt, there is no indication that Mr. Longee's prior 
convictions involved separate victims, separate incidents, separate locations, or 
different dates. (State's Exhibit Nos. 41 and 42.) Nor is there any indication that 
Mr. Longee was warned, at the time of his guilty pleas in those matters, that he would 
be subjectto the strictures of Idaho's persistent violator statute. (State's ExhibitNos. 41 
and 42.) Additionally, the facts presented by the State are similar to those in Harrington 
in which the general rule was applied to bar application of the persistent violator 
enhancement. Specifically, Mr. Longee's two convictions were for the same charge 
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(burglary), and resulted in concurrent, unified sentences of eight years,6 with jurisdiction 
retained in each case. (State's Exhibit Nos. 41 and 42.) 
Perhaps the State could have established facts similar to those presented in 
Brandt, Smith, and Mace in order to invoke the exception had it chosen to present 
charging instruments for the two cases, documents regarding a plea agreement, and/or 
transcripts from the plea hearings. Having chosen not to do so, the State failed to 
present sufficient evidence that Mr. Longee had two prior felony convictions that were 
separate and distinct for purposes of the persistent violator enhancement. 
Because the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Mr. Longee's two 
prior convictions for burglary were separate and distinct convictions necessary to invoke 
the exception to the general rule adopted in Brandt, he respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate the persistent violator finding, and remand this matter for resentencing 
without applying the persistent violator enhancement. 
6 The only difference is that in one, Mr. Longee received a fixed term of two years, while 
in the other, he received a fixed term of three years. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Longee respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this matter for a new trial. Additionally, 
he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the persistent violator finding, and, 
depending on this Court's ruling on the first issue, either remand the matter for 
resentencing without the enhancement or prohibit the State from seeking the 
enhancement at the retrial. 
DATED this 12th day of July, 2013. i/ ' 
( IL' , ____, 
i v.\.-,0..J ... --··-------~--
SP?EN5;ER J. HAHN 
Dee'State Appellate Public Defender 
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